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Keyword and entity retrieval over indexed evidence, hypotheses, and claims. Nothing is answered from model memory on this page. For a scored percentage with the working shown, open Fact or Fiction.
Topic remit
Day of
Engineering
Facilitation
Intelligence & process
Foreknowledge
Independent cluster
Entities
- Omar al-Bayoumi
- Fahad al-Thumairy
- Mohdar Abdullah
- Caysan Bin Don
- Abdussattar Shaikh
- Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
- Osama Bassnan
- Thomas Kean
- Mohamed Atta
- Ziad Jarrah
- Norman Mineta
- Dick Cheney
- Anthony Shaffer
- Kenneth Williams
- Zacarias Moussaoui
- Richard Gage
- Steven E. Jones
- Niels H. Harrit
- J. Leroy Hulsey
- Barry Jennings
- William Rodriguez
- Curt Weldon
- Mahmoud Ahmad
- George W. Bush
- David Ray Griffin
- David Chandler
- Ted Walter
- Tony Szamboti
- Kevin R. Ryan
- Piers Robinson
- Natalie Schilling
- Jonathan H. Cole
- Philip Zelikow
- Søren Roest Korsgaard
- Lorie Van Auken
- Bob McIlvaine
- Peter Dale Scott
- Paul Zarembka
- Barbara Honegger
- Kristina Claunch
- Mary Marshall Clark
- Peter Bearman
- Barbara Elias-Sanborn
- Richard A. Clarke
- Sajit Gandhi
- Michael Horrocks
- Thomas W. Eagar
- Christopher Musso
Matching hypotheses
- H008U.S. agencies possessed actionable pre-attack intelligence on these two operativesScore
- H009Relevant intelligence was withheld from the 9/11 CommissionScore
- H012Unusual pre-attack put-option activity reflected advance knowledge of the attacksScore
- H015Able Danger identified Atta's cell before 9/11 and was blocked from warning the FBIScore
- H016Urban Moving Systems detainees had organisational advance knowledge of the attacksScore
- H020Specific pre-attack warnings (Odigo and similar) show that some non-plot actors knew the morning's targetingScore
- H021The 9/11 Commission was structurally prevented from being a truth-seeking enquiryScore
Matching claims
- partially_supportedCLM-003
Omar al-Bayoumi was a paid cooptee of Saudi GIP reporting via Ambassador Bandar.
- verifiedCLM-007
U.S. agencies had actionable information on Mihdhar's U.S. visa in January 2000 and failed to watchlist him until August 2001.
- indeterminateCLM-008
Bayoumi had advance knowledge that the 9/11 attacks would occur.
- well_supportedCLM-009
The FBI withheld Bayoumi-related intelligence from the 9/11 Commission.
- disputedCLM-013
Aircraft impact and the ensuing fires initiated the collapses of WTC 1 and WTC 2 without additional energetic devices.
- disputedCLM-015
WTC 7 collapsed from ordinary office fires following debris impact, without explosives.
- disputedCLM-018
UA93 was shot down by U.S. military rather than crashed by a passenger counterattack.
- disputedCLM-020
Able Danger identified Mohamed Atta's cell before 11 September and was blocked from notifying the FBI.
- indeterminateCLM-021
Unusual pre-attack put-option activity reflected trading by people with advance knowledge of the plot.
- unverifiedCLM-022
The five Urban Moving Systems detainees had advance knowledge of the attacks as an Israeli intelligence team.
- unverifiedCLM-024
Pakistan's ISI chief authorised a pre-attack transfer to Mohamed Atta.
- contradictedCLM-025
Some of the named 19 hijackers were not aboard the aircraft / were still alive.
- disputedCLM-030
WTC 7's entire measurable north and west rooflines instantaneously transitioned to free fall, a behaviour NIST's Stage 1 description conceals.
- disputedCLM-031
The 9/11 Commission was not a truth-seeking body; the Report is a 'Zelikow Report' defined by systematic omissions.
- disputedCLM-033
First-responder explosion-language about the Twin Towers is evidence of demolition charges.
- unverifiedCLM-034
Reported 9/11 aircraft manoeuvres were not flyable manually by the named hijacker-pilots (automation/remote guidance).
- disputedCLM-035
A small CIA Alec Station group intentionally withheld Mihdhar/Hazmi information from the FBI, and the purpose became to allow the attacks.
- disputedCLM-036
The Pentagon attack involved inside-the-building explosives before AA77's official impact.
- verifiedCLM-037
A large born-digital public archive of 11 September emails, stories, and images exists and was acquired by the Library of Congress in 2003.
- well_supportedCLM-038
Street-level witnesses in lower Manhattan saw/heard a second aircraft hit the South Tower.
- well_supportedCLM-039
CIA senior products in summer 2001 described Bin Ladin attacks as imminent, including a strike in the US, without time/place/target.
- well_supportedCLM-042
About three-quarters of CIA materials cited by the 9/11 Commission, including all KSM interrogation reports, remained withheld as of the 2012 File posting.
Evidence supporting
65David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in the 9/11 Commission Report (Toronto Report ch.2)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists Commission process constraints (Zelikow, funding, access) and twelve claimed omissions, with footnotes to named books, newspapers, and the Report itself.
Able Danger: Shaffer/Weldon say Atta's Brooklyn cell was identified before 9/11
Able Danger hearings and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer / Rep. Curt Weldon statements (2005) · 2005-09-21
Able Danger officers testified they had identified Atta before 9/11 and were blocked from notifying the FBI. Commission staff found the claim unsupported.
CIA 9/11 File posting — 100+ FOIA documents, 19 June 2012
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2012-06-19
In 2012 the National Security Archive posted 100+ CIA documents cited in Commission footnotes, and stated that this was about one-quarter of the CIA material the Commission cited, with KSM interrogation reports still withheld.
Paul Zarembka — Insider trading before 9/11 re-examined (Toronto Report ch.6)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
A 2012 hearing paper surveys three academic option-market studies and argues the combined pre-attack activity is not plausibly random, while treating UAL/AMR themselves as weak because of hedging.
Poteshman 2006: unusual put-option volume on airlines before 9/11
Allen M. Poteshman, 'Unusual Option Market Activity and the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,' Journal of Business 79(4) (2006) · 2006-07-01
A peer-reviewed study found statistically unusual pre-attack put-option activity in airline stocks.
Peter Dale Scott — 9/11 as a deep event: CIA personnel helped allow it (Toronto Report ch.5)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Scott's 2012 chapter restates a documented CIA-to-FBI withholding pattern around Mihdhar and Hazmi (Malaysia 2000, visa, watchlisting) attributed to a small Alec Station group, and adds a Saudi-GID liaison hypothesis plus an 'allowed to proceed' inference.
Evidence contradicting
16Commission/SEC: no evidence anyone with advance knowledge profited in securities
9/11 Commission / SEC review of pre-attack securities trading · 2004-07-22
The Commission published a negative finding on securities profits by people with advance knowledge of the attacks.
Commission staff: Able Danger Atta identification not substantiated
9/11 Commission Report · 2005-08-12
Commission staff published that they could not substantiate a pre-9/11 Able Danger identification of Atta.
Commission: UA93 crashed near Shanksville at 10:03:11 after a passenger revolt
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
UA93 impacted a field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, at 10:03:11. Official transcription of the CVR describes a passenger counterattack.
Commission: no evidence Thumairy assisted the two operatives
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
2004 Commission published a negative finding on Thumairy assistance.
Commission: hijacker-still-alive reports were mistaken identity
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
The Commission treats early 'hijackers alive' stories as identification errors.
Commission: Bayoumi did not give them money beyond the reimbursed check
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
Commission found no continuing financial transfers from Bayoumi to the two men.
Ambiguous
80CIA IG August 2001: CTC practices reviewed positively — vs later OIG/Commission
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-01
NSArchive records that a CIA Inspector General review completed in August 2001 praised CTC information-management and FBI cooperation, in contrast to the 2004 CIA OIG and the Commission.
Wikipedia, 9/11 conspiracy theories — article as finding aid (retrieved 3 Sep 2026)
Wikipedia — 9/11 conspiracy theories (encyclopedia article) · 2026-09-03
On 3 September 2026 the Wikipedia article listed the main 9/11 conspiracy-theory families and pointed at Commission, NIST, State Department, Eagar, and Popular Mechanics as external sources.
CIA CTC 2003-40044HC — '11 September: The Plot and the Plotters'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2003-06-01
A 1 June 2003 CIA CTC report titled 11 September: The Plot and the Plotters exists, is a major Commission source, and includes the analytical claim that the Saudi composition of the teams had political as well as visa-access value.
September 11th Sourcebooks index (NSArchive volumes I–VII and updates)
National Security Archive — September 11th Sourcebooks · 2026-09-03
The National Security Archive organised a September 11th Sourcebook series of at least seven volumes plus later FOIA postings on Clarke, FAA, and NTSB transcripts.
Commission character assessment of Bayoumi
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
The 2004 Commission published a negative finding on Bayoumi's knowing extremist involvement.
Journal of 9/11 Studies — full article catalog (2006–2025)
Journal of 9/11 Studies · 2026-09-02
IC911 hosts a journal catalog of 70+ items. Several flight papers (Wyndham 2011, Legge & Stutt 2011, Salter 2006) argue against no-plane / no-Boeing theories.
Contemporary reports
75Commission/SEC: no evidence anyone with advance knowledge profited in securities
9/11 Commission / SEC review of pre-attack securities trading · 2004-07-22
The Commission published a negative finding on securities profits by people with advance knowledge of the attacks.
CIA IG August 2001: CTC practices reviewed positively — vs later OIG/Commission
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-01
NSArchive records that a CIA Inspector General review completed in August 2001 praised CTC information-management and FBI cooperation, in contrast to the 2004 CIA OIG and the Commission.
CIA had Mihdhar visa information in January 2000; FBI notified August 2001
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
U.S. intelligence possessed Mihdhar's visa/travel data in January 2000 and did not get it to FBI watchlisting until August 2001.
Clarke to Rice, 25 January 2001: Principals-level review of al-Qaeda urgently needed
Richard Clarke memo to Condoleezza Rice, 25 January 2001 (NSAEBB 147) · 2001-01-25
On 25 January 2001 Richard Clarke wrote to Condoleezza Rice that a Principals-level review of al-Qaeda was urgently needed.
Commission: UA93 crashed near Shanksville at 10:03:11 after a passenger revolt
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
UA93 impacted a field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, at 10:03:11. Official transcription of the CVR describes a passenger counterattack.
Commission: no evidence Thumairy assisted the two operatives
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
2004 Commission published a negative finding on Thumairy assistance.
Later recollections / analysis
86David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in the 9/11 Commission Report (Toronto Report ch.2)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists Commission process constraints (Zelikow, funding, access) and twelve claimed omissions, with footnotes to named books, newspapers, and the Report itself.
Able Danger: Shaffer/Weldon say Atta's Brooklyn cell was identified before 9/11
Able Danger hearings and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer / Rep. Curt Weldon statements (2005) · 2005-09-21
Able Danger officers testified they had identified Atta before 9/11 and were blocked from notifying the FBI. Commission staff found the claim unsupported.
Commission staff: Able Danger Atta identification not substantiated
9/11 Commission Report · 2005-08-12
Commission staff published that they could not substantiate a pre-9/11 Able Danger identification of Atta.
CIA 9/11 File posting — 100+ FOIA documents, 19 June 2012
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2012-06-19
In 2012 the National Security Archive posted 100+ CIA documents cited in Commission footnotes, and stated that this was about one-quarter of the CIA material the Commission cited, with KSM interrogation reports still withheld.
Paul Zarembka — Insider trading before 9/11 re-examined (Toronto Report ch.6)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
A 2012 hearing paper surveys three academic option-market studies and argues the combined pre-attack activity is not plausibly random, while treating UAL/AMR themselves as weak because of hedging.
Poteshman 2006: unusual put-option volume on airlines before 9/11
Allen M. Poteshman, 'Unusual Option Market Activity and the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,' Journal of Business 79(4) (2006) · 2006-07-01
A peer-reviewed study found statistically unusual pre-attack put-option activity in airline stocks.
Official documents
78Commission/SEC: no evidence anyone with advance knowledge profited in securities
9/11 Commission / SEC review of pre-attack securities trading · 2004-07-22
The Commission published a negative finding on securities profits by people with advance knowledge of the attacks.
Able Danger: Shaffer/Weldon say Atta's Brooklyn cell was identified before 9/11
Able Danger hearings and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer / Rep. Curt Weldon statements (2005) · 2005-09-21
Able Danger officers testified they had identified Atta before 9/11 and were blocked from notifying the FBI. Commission staff found the claim unsupported.
CIA IG August 2001: CTC practices reviewed positively — vs later OIG/Commission
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-01
NSArchive records that a CIA Inspector General review completed in August 2001 praised CTC information-management and FBI cooperation, in contrast to the 2004 CIA OIG and the Commission.
Commission staff: Able Danger Atta identification not substantiated
9/11 Commission Report · 2005-08-12
Commission staff published that they could not substantiate a pre-9/11 Able Danger identification of Atta.
CIA 9/11 File posting — 100+ FOIA documents, 19 June 2012
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2012-06-19
In 2012 the National Security Archive posted 100+ CIA documents cited in Commission footnotes, and stated that this was about one-quarter of the CIA material the Commission cited, with KSM interrogation reports still withheld.
FBI 2017: Commission-era non-confirmation, later confirmation of intel role
FBI materials released under Executive Order 14040 · 2017-06-14
FBI 2017 text asserts the intelligence-role allegation was unconfirmed in 2004 and is now confirmed.
Independent / media
56David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in the 9/11 Commission Report (Toronto Report ch.2)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists Commission process constraints (Zelikow, funding, access) and twelve claimed omissions, with footnotes to named books, newspapers, and the Report itself.
Paul Zarembka — Insider trading before 9/11 re-examined (Toronto Report ch.6)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
A 2012 hearing paper surveys three academic option-market studies and argues the combined pre-attack activity is not plausibly random, while treating UAL/AMR themselves as weak because of hedging.
Peter Dale Scott — 9/11 as a deep event: CIA personnel helped allow it (Toronto Report ch.5)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Scott's 2012 chapter restates a documented CIA-to-FBI withholding pattern around Mihdhar and Hazmi (Malaysia 2000, visa, watchlisting) attributed to a small Alec Station group, and adds a Saudi-GID liaison hypothesis plus an 'allowed to proceed' inference.
David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in official accounts of AA77 and UA93 (Toronto Report ch.7)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists named process contradictions on AA77 notification and UA93 notification, plus Pentagon-object and UA93-shoot-down arguments with named witnesses and an FAA memo.
Wikipedia, 9/11 conspiracy theories — article as finding aid (retrieved 3 Sep 2026)
Wikipedia — 9/11 conspiracy theories (encyclopedia article) · 2026-09-03
On 3 September 2026 the Wikipedia article listed the main 9/11 conspiracy-theory families and pointed at Commission, NIST, State Department, Eagar, and Popular Mechanics as external sources.
Piers Robinson — Researching 9/11 and Beyond: Current Knowledge and Future Directions (Aug 2024)
Journal of 9/11 Studies · 2024-08-01
Robinson's 2024 survey cites Harrit 2009, Hulsey 2020, MacQueen eyewitness counts, NIST NCSTAR, the Commission, Ashton v KSA, and a 2023 Klarenberg claim of a CIA-Saudi recruiting operation involving two hijackers. He states official investigations are flawed and demolition of WTC 1/2/7 is most likely.
Unresolved contradictions
- CTR-001Bayoumi's intelligence role: Commission 2004 vs FBI 2017
- CTR-002Thumairy assistance: Commission vs FBI 2021
- CTR-010Able Danger Atta identification
- CTR-011Put options: unusual volume vs no plot-participant profits
- CTR-012Hijacker identities: BBC still-alive vs Commission mistaken-identity
- CTR-017WTC 7 Stage 1: NIST gradual vs Chandler instantaneous whole-roofline free fall
- CTR-018Commission completeness vs Griffin omissions list
- CTR-021CIA IG August 2001 praise vs 2004 CIA OIG / Commission on CTC
- CTR-022NTSB public-docket refusal vs NSArchive FOIA release of the same path/ATC files