Fact or Fiction
Fact or Fiction
Ask any question, including odd ones. You get a percentage, a clear call of more or less than 50%, the working, and the sources that produced it. If nothing matches, the score stays at 50% — nothing is invented.
Likelihood
H015 Able Danger identified Atta's cell before 9/11 and was blocked from warning the FBI
57%
More than 50% — weakly supported by the sources
The score is 57% — more than 50%. Supporting sources currently outweigh contradicting sources after quality and confidence are applied.
How 57% was calculated
Start at 50%. Move by half of the net source score after uncertainty. Net source score is 0.55 (from −1 contradict to +1 support). Uncertainty is 76%. So 50% + 50% × 0.55 × 24% remaining certainty = 57%.
Supporting sources
13
Weighted strength 2.82
Contradicting sources
3
Weighted strength 0.81
No stance yet
33
Pulls the score toward 50% · 11.59
Uncertainty
76%
Share of the file that is unlabelled or missing
Working
start at 50% + half of (net source score × remaining certainty)
0.5 + 0.5 × 0.55 × (1 − 0.76) = 0.566
This percentage is calculated from the sources listed below — it is a score, not a court finding. Official origin does not add extra weight. Independent origin does not subtract weight. Two papers from the same group are one cluster, not two independent confirmations.
Reasoning
Step 1 · Match the question
Closest stored question: H015 — Able Danger identified Atta's cell before 9/11 and was blocked from warning the FBI. Yes/no labels are taken from sources already linked to that question. Also close: H008, H020, H011.
Step 2 · Find matching sources
40 source(s) matched the wording. 2 further source(s) already linked to the stored question were included even if they did not contain the search words. 6 matching claim(s) contributed inherited stances.
Step 3 · Assign support or contradiction without inventing
2 labelled from stored question links, 14 from claims, 0 labelled automatically (capped, marked, not saved as human review), 33 left with no stance.
Step 4 · Weight each source
Each source contributes strength = (quality / 5) × confidence × how strongly it agrees or disagrees. Support strength 2.82, contradict strength 0.81, no-stance strength 11.59. A zero on chain of custody still lowers the mean and stays visible.
Step 5 · Turn that into a percentage
Start at 50%. Move up if support outweighs contradiction, down if the reverse. Unlabelled sources shrink the movement, so a thin file stays near 50%. Working: 0.5 + 0.5 × 0.55 × (1 − 0.76) = 0.566.
Step 6 · What this number is not
This percentage is calculated from the sources listed below — it is a score, not a court finding. Official origin does not add extra weight. Independent origin does not subtract weight. Two papers from the same group are one cluster, not two independent confirmations.
What is still missing
- 4 source(s) score zero on at least one quality check (shown on each card). Those zeros are kept visible and are not averaged away.
- 5 source(s) are unverified, inactive, or recorded as not retrieved. A missing file is a gap, not a finding against the question.
- 33 relevant source(s) have no stance yet. They increase uncertainty and pull the percentage toward 50%; they are not counted as support or contradiction.
- A second stored question (H008) also matches this wording. The percentage below is for H015 only — open the other question to compare. Do not average the two numbers.
Closest stored question
H015 · Able Danger identified Atta's cell before 9/11 and was blocked from warning the FBIintelligence_failure · match 56
Related questions
Same wording can map to more than one stored question. Each has its own percentage — do not average them.
Matching claims
- disputedCLM-020
Able Danger identified Mohamed Atta's cell before 11 September and was blocked from notifying the FBI.
- disputedCLM-035
A small CIA Alec Station group intentionally withheld Mihdhar/Hazmi information from the FBI, and the purpose became to allow the attacks.
- well_supportedCLM-009
The FBI withheld Bayoumi-related intelligence from the 9/11 Commission.
- disputedCLM-036
The Pentagon attack involved inside-the-building explosives before AA77's official impact.
- disputedCLM-031
The 9/11 Commission was not a truth-seeking body; the Report is a 'Zelikow Report' defined by systematic omissions.
- verifiedCLM-037
A large born-digital public archive of 11 September emails, stories, and images exists and was acquired by the Library of Congress in 2003.
Sources that support this
13Able Danger: Shaffer/Weldon say Atta's Brooklyn cell was identified before 9/11
Able Danger hearings and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer / Rep. Curt Weldon statements (2005) · 2005-09-21
Able Danger officers testified they had identified Atta before 9/11 and were blocked from notifying the FBI. Commission staff found the claim unsupported.
hypothesis link · human_seed link to H015 (seeded): Shaffer/Weldon Atta-identification testimony.
CIA had Mihdhar visa information in January 2000; FBI notified August 2001
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
U.S. intelligence possessed Mihdhar's visa/travel data in January 2000 and did not get it to FBI watchlisting until August 2001.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-035.
FBI 2017: Commission-era non-confirmation, later confirmation of intel role
FBI materials released under Executive Order 14040 · 2017-06-14
FBI 2017 text asserts the intelligence-role allegation was unconfirmed in 2004 and is now confirmed.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-009.
Barbara Honegger — Evidence of explosives at the Pentagon (Toronto Report ch.13)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Honegger compiles Pentagon witnesses who used bomb/cordite language, cites stopped clocks around 9:31–9:32, and treats the FBI code name PENTTBOM as evidence of a bombing investigation.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-036.
David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in the 9/11 Commission Report (Toronto Report ch.2)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists Commission process constraints (Zelikow, funding, access) and twelve claimed omissions, with footnotes to named books, newspapers, and the Report itself.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-031.
Commission leadership: FBI said it wasn't withholding anything
ProPublica / New York Times reporting on declassified FBI files (2023–2024) · 2023-04-27
The Commission chair states the FBI represented that nothing was being withheld.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-009.
Mineta: Cheney asked if 'the orders still stand' as an aircraft approached
Norman Mineta testimony, 9/11 Commission hearing, 23 May 2003 · 2003-05-23
Norman Mineta testified that Cheney confirmed standing orders while being updated on an inbound aircraft's decreasing range.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-031.
Sources that contradict this
3Commission staff: Able Danger Atta identification not substantiated
9/11 Commission Report · 2005-08-12
Commission staff published that they could not substantiate a pre-9/11 Able Danger identification of Atta.
hypothesis link · human_seed link to H015 (seeded): Commission staff unsubstantiated.
NTSB flight-path study: AA77 from Dulles to the Pentagon
NTSB flight-path studies, Air Traffic Control tapes, and CVR/FDR summaries (AA11, UA175, AA77, UA93) · 2002-02-19
NTSB reconstructed a continuous radar/path track of AA77 from takeoff to the Pentagon.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-036.
John D. Wyndham — Problems with theories alternative to large-plane impact at the Pentagon (Nov 2011)
Journal of 9/11 Studies · 2011-11-01
The Journal of 9/11 Studies published a 2011 paper arguing that theories alternative to a large-plane Pentagon impact have problems.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-036.
Sources with no stance yet
33David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in official accounts of AA77 and UA93 (Toronto Report ch.7)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists named process contradictions on AA77 notification and UA93 notification, plus Pentagon-object and UA93-shoot-down arguments with named witnesses and an FAA memo.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
Coleen Rowley: FBI HQ blocked a FISA search of Moussaoui's laptop
Coleen Rowley memo to FBI Director Mueller (May 2002) on the Moussaoui case · 2002-05-21
A flight-school student connected to radical jihadist travel was in FBI custody before 11 September; a requested FISA search was not obtained.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
Odigo: two employees received a warning message about two hours before the first impact
Odigo instant-message warning reports (Ha'aretz / Washington Post, 2001) · 2001-09-28
Odigo confirmed that two employees received a pre-attack warning message; origin not established in public files.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
Paul Zarembka — Insider trading before 9/11 re-examined (Toronto Report ch.6)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
A 2012 hearing paper surveys three academic option-market studies and argues the combined pre-attack activity is not plausibly random, while treating UAL/AMR themselves as weak because of hedging.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
CIA SEIBs June–August 2001: Bin Ladin attacks 'imminent' / 'in the US'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-07
CIA senior briefs from June–August 2001 repeatedly warned of imminent Bin Ladin operations, including a 7 August SEIB titled 'Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US', and a 24 August note that an associated individual was considering U.S. operations without timing or targets.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
FBI 2017: Bayoumi paid as GIP cooptee via Ambassador Bandar
FBI materials released under Executive Order 14040 · 2017-06-14
An official FBI analytical document asserts Bayoumi was a paid GIP cooptee through Bandar, 1998–2001.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
CIA IG August 2001: CTC practices reviewed positively — vs later OIG/Commission
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-01
NSArchive records that a CIA Inspector General review completed in August 2001 praised CTC information-management and FBI cooperation, in contrast to the 2004 CIA OIG and the Commission.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
Poteshman 2006: unusual put-option volume on airlines before 9/11
Allen M. Poteshman, 'Unusual Option Market Activity and the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,' Journal of Business 79(4) (2006) · 2006-07-01
A peer-reviewed study found statistically unusual pre-attack put-option activity in airline stocks.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
Topics
Day-of events, engineering questions, process failures, and foreknowledge leads.