EVD-322
Clarke to Rice, 25 January 2001: Principals-level review of al-Qaeda urgently needed
documentofficial governmentauthenticoriginal
Provenance
- Source
- Richard Clarke memo to Condoleezza Rice, 25 January 2001 (NSAEBB 147)
- Date
- 2001-01-25
- Page
- —
- SHA-256
- 9cc5b7142a13769f0a8ae4fe017c80afb706a22b5ab4df8e389c5632fd208096
- Classification
- unclassified
- Copyright
- unknown
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB147/index.htm
Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
Observation
On 25 January 2001 Richard Clarke wrote to Condoleezza Rice that a Principals-level review of al-Qaeda was urgently needed.
Interpretation
The memo exists. Whether it equals a 'comprehensive strategy' is a later political dispute. Process evidence for pre-attack pace (H008/H011-adjacent), not for a specific 11 September plot known that day.
Source text
OBSERVATION (NSAEBB 147, posted 10 February 2005, updated 27 September 2006, edited by Barbara Elias). Richard Clarke memo to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, 25 January 2001, requesting a Principals-level review of al-Qaeda. The Archive presents it as the first terrorism strategy paper of the Bush administration and as the document central to the later Clarke–Rice dispute. Rice public line (Archive's 2006 update): 'We were not left a comprehensive strategy to fight al-Qaida.' Clinton public line: he left a comprehensive anti-terror strategy. The memo's quoted ask is a Principals review, not a claim that a finished war plan sat on the desk. Related Archive posting: 'A Comprehensive Strategy to Fight Al-Qaeda'? Rice versus Clinton on the January 2001 Clarke Memo.
Hypothesis linkage
Clarke's January 2001 Principals-review ask is process pace, not plot knowledge.
Citations
- No citation edges.