Fact or Fiction
Fact or Fiction
Ask any question, including odd ones. You get a percentage, a clear call of more or less than 50%, the working, and the sources that produced it. If nothing matches, the score stays at 50% — nothing is invented.
Likelihood
9/11 Commission / SEC review of pre-attack securities trading
57%
More than 50% — weakly supported by the sources
The score is 57% — more than 50%. Supporting sources currently outweigh contradicting sources after quality and confidence are applied.
How 57% was calculated
Start at 50%. Move by half of the net source score after uncertainty. Net source score is 0.62 (from −1 contradict to +1 support). Uncertainty is 77%. So 50% + 50% × 0.62 × 23% remaining certainty = 57%.
Supporting sources
12
Weighted strength 2.56
Contradicting sources
2
Weighted strength 0.59
No stance yet
31
Pulls the score toward 50% · 10.31
Uncertainty
77%
Share of the file that is unlabelled or missing
Working
start at 50% + half of (net source score × remaining certainty)
0.5 + 0.5 × 0.62 × (1 − 0.77) = 0.571
This percentage is calculated from the sources listed below — it is a score, not a court finding. Official origin does not add extra weight. Independent origin does not subtract weight. Two papers from the same group are one cluster, not two independent confirmations.
Reasoning
Step 1 · Match the question
Closest stored question: H012 — Unusual pre-attack put-option activity reflected advance knowledge of the attacks. Yes/no labels are taken from sources already linked to that question. Also close: H015, H021, H008.
Step 2 · Find matching sources
40 source(s) matched the wording. 4 further source(s) already linked to the stored question were included even if they did not contain the search words. 6 matching claim(s) contributed inherited stances.
Step 3 · Assign support or contradiction without inventing
4 labelled from stored question links, 11 from claims, 0 labelled automatically (capped, marked, not saved as human review), 30 left with no stance.
Step 4 · Weight each source
Each source contributes strength = (quality / 5) × confidence × how strongly it agrees or disagrees. Support strength 2.56, contradict strength 0.59, no-stance strength 10.31. A zero on chain of custody still lowers the mean and stays visible.
Step 5 · Turn that into a percentage
Start at 50%. Move up if support outweighs contradiction, down if the reverse. Unlabelled sources shrink the movement, so a thin file stays near 50%. Working: 0.5 + 0.5 × 0.62 × (1 − 0.77) = 0.571.
Step 6 · What this number is not
This percentage is calculated from the sources listed below — it is a score, not a court finding. Official origin does not add extra weight. Independent origin does not subtract weight. Two papers from the same group are one cluster, not two independent confirmations.
What is still missing
- 6 source(s) score zero on at least one quality check (shown on each card). Those zeros are kept visible and are not averaged away.
- 4 source(s) are unverified, inactive, or recorded as not retrieved. A missing file is a gap, not a finding against the question.
- 31 relevant source(s) have no stance yet. They increase uncertainty and pull the percentage toward 50%; they are not counted as support or contradiction.
- A second stored question (H015) also matches this wording. The percentage below is for H012 only — open the other question to compare. Do not average the two numbers.
Closest stored question
H012 · Unusual pre-attack put-option activity reflected advance knowledge of the attacksforeknowledge · match 9.5
Related questions
Same wording can map to more than one stored question. Each has its own percentage — do not average them.
Matching claims
- indeterminateCLM-021
Unusual pre-attack put-option activity reflected trading by people with advance knowledge of the plot.
- disputedCLM-031
The 9/11 Commission was not a truth-seeking body; the Report is a 'Zelikow Report' defined by systematic omissions.
- disputedCLM-020
Able Danger identified Mohamed Atta's cell before 11 September and was blocked from notifying the FBI.
- well_supportedCLM-042
About three-quarters of CIA materials cited by the 9/11 Commission, including all KSM interrogation reports, remained withheld as of the 2012 File posting.
- unverifiedCLM-024
Pakistan's ISI chief authorised a pre-attack transfer to Mohamed Atta.
- well_supportedCLM-009
The FBI withheld Bayoumi-related intelligence from the 9/11 Commission.
Sources that support this
12David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in the 9/11 Commission Report (Toronto Report ch.2)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists Commission process constraints (Zelikow, funding, access) and twelve claimed omissions, with footnotes to named books, newspapers, and the Report itself.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-031.
Able Danger: Shaffer/Weldon say Atta's Brooklyn cell was identified before 9/11
Able Danger hearings and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer / Rep. Curt Weldon statements (2005) · 2005-09-21
Able Danger officers testified they had identified Atta before 9/11 and were blocked from notifying the FBI. Commission staff found the claim unsupported.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-020.
Paul Zarembka — Insider trading before 9/11 re-examined (Toronto Report ch.6)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
A 2012 hearing paper surveys three academic option-market studies and argues the combined pre-attack activity is not plausibly random, while treating UAL/AMR themselves as weak because of hedging.
hypothesis link · human_seed link to H012 (seeded): Zarembka surveys Poteshman/Wong/Chesney as combined non-random activity. Derivative of EVD-132.
CIA 9/11 File posting — 100+ FOIA documents, 19 June 2012
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2012-06-19
In 2012 the National Security Archive posted 100+ CIA documents cited in Commission footnotes, and stated that this was about one-quarter of the CIA material the Commission cited, with KSM interrogation reports still withheld.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-042.
Poteshman 2006: unusual put-option volume on airlines before 9/11
Allen M. Poteshman, 'Unusual Option Market Activity and the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,' Journal of Business 79(4) (2006) · 2006-07-01
A peer-reviewed study found statistically unusual pre-attack put-option activity in airline stocks.
hypothesis link · human_seed link to H012 (seeded): Peer-reviewed unusual put volume.
FBI 2017: Commission-era non-confirmation, later confirmation of intel role
FBI materials released under Executive Order 14040 · 2017-06-14
FBI 2017 text asserts the intelligence-role allegation was unconfirmed in 2004 and is now confirmed.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-009.
9/11 Commission did not investigate WTC 7's collapse mechanism
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
The 9/11 Commission did not produce a collapse-mechanism finding for WTC 7.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-031.
Commission leadership: FBI said it wasn't withholding anything
ProPublica / New York Times reporting on declassified FBI files (2023–2024) · 2023-04-27
The Commission chair states the FBI represented that nothing was being withheld.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-009.
Sources that contradict this
2Commission/SEC: no evidence anyone with advance knowledge profited in securities
9/11 Commission / SEC review of pre-attack securities trading · 2004-07-22
The Commission published a negative finding on securities profits by people with advance knowledge of the attacks.
hypothesis link · human_seed link to H012 (seeded): Commission/SEC: no profits by people with advance knowledge.
Commission staff: Able Danger Atta identification not substantiated
9/11 Commission Report · 2005-08-12
Commission staff published that they could not substantiate a pre-9/11 Able Danger identification of Atta.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-020.
Sources with no stance yet
31Stratesec / Marvin Bush board role at a firm with WTC security work
Composite tertiary web commentary (circular-sourcing demonstration) · 2005-01-01
A firm with some WTC security work had a Bush family board member years before 9/11.
hypothesis link · zeros: contemporaneity, corroboration, chain_of_custody · human_seed link to H012 (seeded): Stratesec/Bush-board adjacency is not securities trading.
Quality zeros remain visible: contemporaneity, corroboration, chain_of_custody.
CIA IG August 2001: CTC practices reviewed positively — vs later OIG/Commission
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-01
NSArchive records that a CIA Inspector General review completed in August 2001 praised CTC information-management and FBI cooperation, in contrast to the 2004 CIA OIG and the Commission.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
Peter Dale Scott — 9/11 as a deep event: CIA personnel helped allow it (Toronto Report ch.5)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Scott's 2012 chapter restates a documented CIA-to-FBI withholding pattern around Mihdhar and Hazmi (Malaysia 2000, visa, watchlisting) attributed to a small Alec Station group, and adds a Saudi-GID liaison hypothesis plus an 'allowed to proceed' inference.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
CIA had Mihdhar visa information in January 2000; FBI notified August 2001
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
U.S. intelligence possessed Mihdhar's visa/travel data in January 2000 and did not get it to FBI watchlisting until August 2001.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
Clarke to Rice, 25 January 2001: Principals-level review of al-Qaeda urgently needed
Richard Clarke memo to Condoleezza Rice, 25 January 2001 (NSAEBB 147) · 2001-01-25
On 25 January 2001 Richard Clarke wrote to Condoleezza Rice that a Principals-level review of al-Qaeda was urgently needed.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
Commission: UA93 crashed near Shanksville at 10:03:11 after a passenger revolt
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
UA93 impacted a field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, at 10:03:11. Official transcription of the CVR describes a passenger counterattack.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
Commission: no evidence Thumairy assisted the two operatives
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
2004 Commission published a negative finding on Thumairy assistance.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in official accounts of AA77 and UA93 (Toronto Report ch.7)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists named process contradictions on AA77 notification and UA93 notification, plus Pentagon-object and UA93-shoot-down arguments with named witnesses and an FAA memo.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
Topics
Day-of events, engineering questions, process failures, and foreknowledge leads.