EFI·Evidence Fusion Initiative

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Keyword and entity retrieval over indexed evidence, hypotheses, and claims. Nothing is answered from model memory on this page. For a scored percentage with the working shown, open Fact or Fiction.

Score this

Topic remit

Day of

Engineering

Facilitation

Intelligence & process

Foreknowledge

Independent cluster

Entities

Matching hypotheses

  • H007Saudi-linked individuals knowingly facilitated Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-MihdharScore
  • H008U.S. agencies possessed actionable pre-attack intelligence on these two operativesScore
  • H009Relevant intelligence was withheld from the 9/11 CommissionScore
  • H003Aircraft impact and subsequent fire initiated WTC1 collapseScore
  • H012Unusual pre-attack put-option activity reflected advance knowledge of the attacksScore
  • H013UA93 was shot down rather than crashed solely by a passenger revoltScore
  • H014The Pentagon was not struck by AA77 (missile or other object)Score
  • H015Able Danger identified Atta's cell before 9/11 and was blocked from warning the FBIScore
  • H016Urban Moving Systems detainees had organisational advance knowledge of the attacksScore
  • H017Directed energy, not impact/fire/conventional explosives, destroyed the twin towersScore
  • H020Specific pre-attack warnings (Odigo and similar) show that some non-plot actors knew the morning's targetingScore
  • H021The 9/11 Commission was structurally prevented from being a truth-seeking enquiryScore

Matching claims

  • verifiedCLM-001

    Omar al-Bayoumi provided housing and banking assistance to Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar in San Diego in February 2000.

  • disputedCLM-002

    The 1 February 2000 restaurant meeting was a chance encounter.

  • partially_supportedCLM-003

    Omar al-Bayoumi was a paid cooptee of Saudi GIP reporting via Ambassador Bandar.

  • contradictedCLM-005

    Fahad al-Thumairy provided no assistance to the two operatives.

  • verifiedCLM-007

    U.S. agencies had actionable information on Mihdhar's U.S. visa in January 2000 and failed to watchlist him until August 2001.

  • indeterminateCLM-008

    Bayoumi had advance knowledge that the 9/11 attacks would occur.

  • well_supportedCLM-009

    The FBI withheld Bayoumi-related intelligence from the 9/11 Commission.

  • disputedCLM-013

    Aircraft impact and the ensuing fires initiated the collapses of WTC 1 and WTC 2 without additional energetic devices.

  • disputedCLM-014

    Unreacted thermitic material was present in WTC dust.

  • disputedCLM-016

    Explosives or other additional energetic mechanisms contributed to WTC 7's failure.

  • disputedCLM-017

    Larry Silverstein ordered WTC 7 pulled in the demolition-slang sense.

  • disputedCLM-018

    UA93 was shot down by U.S. military rather than crashed by a passenger counterattack.

  • contradictedCLM-019

    The Pentagon was not struck by AA77.

  • disputedCLM-020

    Able Danger identified Mohamed Atta's cell before 11 September and was blocked from notifying the FBI.

  • indeterminateCLM-021

    Unusual pre-attack put-option activity reflected trading by people with advance knowledge of the plot.

  • unverifiedCLM-022

    The five Urban Moving Systems detainees had advance knowledge of the attacks as an Israeli intelligence team.

  • unsupportedCLM-023

    The twin towers were destroyed by directed energy, not by impact, fire, or conventional explosives.

  • contradictedCLM-025

    Some of the named 19 hijackers were not aboard the aircraft / were still alive.

  • partially_supportedCLM-026

    NORAD/FAA war-games and false timelines indicate the air-defence failure was more than accident.

  • disputedCLM-030

    WTC 7's entire measurable north and west rooflines instantaneously transitioned to free fall, a behaviour NIST's Stage 1 description conceals.

  • disputedCLM-031

    The 9/11 Commission was not a truth-seeking body; the Report is a 'Zelikow Report' defined by systematic omissions.

  • disputedCLM-032

    NIST NCSTAR reports on the WTC are false as engineering explanations.

  • disputedCLM-033

    First-responder explosion-language about the Twin Towers is evidence of demolition charges.

  • unverifiedCLM-034

    Reported 9/11 aircraft manoeuvres were not flyable manually by the named hijacker-pilots (automation/remote guidance).

  • disputedCLM-035

    A small CIA Alec Station group intentionally withheld Mihdhar/Hazmi information from the FBI, and the purpose became to allow the attacks.

  • disputedCLM-036

    The Pentagon attack involved inside-the-building explosives before AA77's official impact.

  • verifiedCLM-037

    A large born-digital public archive of 11 September emails, stories, and images exists and was acquired by the Library of Congress in 2003.

  • well_supportedCLM-038

    Street-level witnesses in lower Manhattan saw/heard a second aircraft hit the South Tower.

  • well_supportedCLM-039

    CIA senior products in summer 2001 described Bin Ladin attacks as imminent, including a strike in the US, without time/place/target.

  • verifiedCLM-040

    NTSB produced flight-path studies and ATC transcripts for the four hijacked flights and initially refused a public docket.

  • partially_supportedCLM-041

    The U.S. pressed the Taliban to expel bin Laden more than 30 times, with only three approaches in the first Bush year.

  • well_supportedCLM-042

    About three-quarters of CIA materials cited by the 9/11 Commission, including all KSM interrogation reports, remained withheld as of the 2012 File posting.

Evidence supporting

66
EVD-325government report

Taliban File update: U.S. pressed Taliban to expel UBL over 30 times

The Taliban File (NSAEBB 97) and updates · 2004-01-30

The National Security Archive's Taliban File update states the U.S. pressed the Taliban to expel bin Laden over 30 times, with only three approaches in the first Bush year.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-320intelligence cable

CIA SEIBs June–August 2001: Bin Ladin attacks 'imminent' / 'in the US'

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-07

CIA senior briefs from June–August 2001 repeatedly warned of imminent Bin Ladin operations, including a 7 August SEIB titled 'Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US', and a 24 August note that an associated individual was considering U.S. operations without timing or targets.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-334intelligence cable

DCI Report draft 19 March 2004: FBI dissemination still 'spotty'; cultures clash

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2004-03-19

A March 2004 CIA draft history says FBI internal dissemination remained so weak that CIA officers still hand-delivered messages, and that FBI-CIA cultural clash impeded results.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-315government report

CIA 9/11 File posting — 100+ FOIA documents, 19 June 2012

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2012-06-19

In 2012 the National Security Archive posted 100+ CIA documents cited in Commission footnotes, and stated that this was about one-quarter of the CIA material the Commission cited, with KSM interrogation reports still withheld.

Quality 3.63 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp1
Corr3
Spec4
Comp4
Chain4
EVD-317intelligence cable

Predator over Afghanistan, autumn 2000: likely UBL, no shoot capability

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2004-03-19

CIA notes in the 2012 File say an unarmed Predator twice observed a person most likely to be bin Laden in autumn 2000 and could not act.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-316intelligence cable

1998 raw intelligence: UBL hijack trial run at a New York airport

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 1998-12-03

A December 1998 CIA raw report, later a PDB item, stated that a UBL-linked hijack plan was proceeding and that two team members in the U.S. had evaded security in a New York airport trial run.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4

Evidence contradicting

16
EVD-324communication log

UA93 ACARS 09:23 and 09:28 mayday — NSAEBB 196 quotation

NTSB flight-path studies and ATC transcripts released via NSArchive (NSAEBB 196) · 2001-09-11

NTSB ACARS/ATC text quoted by NSArchive: UA93 received a 09:23 warning about cockpit intrusion and the NY impacts, then at 09:28 transmitted a mayday / 'hey get out of here' as it was hijacked.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-145academic paper

Bažant pancake model vs NIST initiation sequence

Bažant et al. — pancake / progressive-collapse papers on the WTC towers · 2002-01-01

Published official-adjacent models disagree on pancake vs bowing-column initiation of the tower collapses.

Quality 2.75 / 5components retained
Prov3
Auth4
Ind3
Contemp1
Corr2
Spec4
Comp3
Chain2
EVD-116flight record

NTSB flight-path study: AA77 from Dulles to the Pentagon

NTSB flight-path studies, Air Traffic Control tapes, and CVR/FDR summaries (AA11, UA175, AA77, UA93) · 2002-02-19

NTSB reconstructed a continuous radar/path track of AA77 from takeoff to the Pentagon.

Quality 4.50 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr5
Spec5
Comp4
Chain5
EVD-122engineering report

NIST / critics: red/gray chips consistent with primer paint, not thermite

NIST WTC investigation FAQs (towers and WTC 7) · 2019-11-20

NIST and subsequent paint-chemistry arguments attribute the red chips to known coatings rather than explosives.

Quality 3.50 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind2
Contemp2
Corr3
Spec3
Comp4
Chain4
EVD-140government report

Commission: hijacker-still-alive reports were mistaken identity

9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22

The Commission treats early 'hijackers alive' stories as identification errors.

Quality 3.88 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind2
Contemp3
Corr4
Spec4
Comp4
Chain4
EVD-117engineering report

ASCE Pentagon building performance: 757-class impact damage

ASCE/SEI Pentagon Building Performance Report (2003) · 2003-01-01

An engineering team mapped interior damage consistent with a large-aircraft mass trajectory through the Pentagon.

Quality 4.00 / 5components retained
Prov4
Auth5
Ind4
Contemp3
Corr4
Spec4
Comp4
Chain4

Ambiguous

81
EVD-314web archive

September 11th Sourcebooks index (NSArchive volumes I–VII and updates)

National Security Archive — September 11th Sourcebooks · 2026-09-03

The National Security Archive organised a September 11th Sourcebook series of at least seven volumes plus later FOIA postings on Clarke, FAA, and NTSB transcripts.

Quality 3.63 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp1
Corr3
Spec4
Comp4
Chain4
EVD-326web archive

The Osama Bin Laden File (NSAEBB 343), posted 2 May 2011

The Osama Bin Laden File (NSAEBB 343) · 2011-05-02

On the day of bin Laden's death the National Security Archive posted an Osama Bin Laden File that is an index of prior FOIA briefing books on UBL, Pakistan, and the Taliban.

Quality 3.63 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp1
Corr3
Spec4
Comp4
Chain4
EVD-333government report

CIA IG August 2001: CTC practices reviewed positively — vs later OIG/Commission

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-01

NSArchive records that a CIA Inspector General review completed in August 2001 praised CTC information-management and FBI cooperation, in contrast to the 2004 CIA OIG and the Commission.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-321intelligence cable

CIA CTC 2003-40044HC — '11 September: The Plot and the Plotters'

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2003-06-01

A 1 June 2003 CIA CTC report titled 11 September: The Plot and the Plotters exists, is a major Commission source, and includes the analytical claim that the Saudi composition of the teams had political as well as visa-access value.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-323flight record

NTSB path studies and ATC transcripts FOIA'd by NSArchive (Aug 2006)

NTSB flight-path studies and ATC transcripts released via NSArchive (NSAEBB 196) · 2006-08-11

In August 2006 NTSB released to the National Security Archive the four-flight ATC transcripts, three path studies, and the UA93 DFDR specialist report, after refusing to open its own public docket.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-030government report

Joint Inquiry discussion of Osama Bassnan and alleged Saudi payments

Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After 9/11 (including Part Four, declassified 2016) · 2016-07-15

A congressional inquiry recorded alleged Bassnan–Saudi official financial ties in the same city as the hijackers.

Quality 2.38 / 5components retained
Prov4
Auth3
Ind3
Contemp3
Corr1
Spec1
Comp1
Chain3

Contemporary reports

76
EVD-325government report

Taliban File update: U.S. pressed Taliban to expel UBL over 30 times

The Taliban File (NSAEBB 97) and updates · 2004-01-30

The National Security Archive's Taliban File update states the U.S. pressed the Taliban to expel bin Laden over 30 times, with only three approaches in the first Bush year.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-333government report

CIA IG August 2001: CTC practices reviewed positively — vs later OIG/Commission

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-01

NSArchive records that a CIA Inspector General review completed in August 2001 praised CTC information-management and FBI cooperation, in contrast to the 2004 CIA OIG and the Commission.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-320intelligence cable

CIA SEIBs June–August 2001: Bin Ladin attacks 'imminent' / 'in the US'

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-07

CIA senior briefs from June–August 2001 repeatedly warned of imminent Bin Ladin operations, including a 7 August SEIB titled 'Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US', and a 24 August note that an associated individual was considering U.S. operations without timing or targets.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-321intelligence cable

CIA CTC 2003-40044HC — '11 September: The Plot and the Plotters'

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2003-06-01

A 1 June 2003 CIA CTC report titled 11 September: The Plot and the Plotters exists, is a major Commission source, and includes the analytical claim that the Saudi composition of the teams had political as well as visa-access value.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-334intelligence cable

DCI Report draft 19 March 2004: FBI dissemination still 'spotty'; cultures clash

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2004-03-19

A March 2004 CIA draft history says FBI internal dissemination remained so weak that CIA officers still hand-delivered messages, and that FBI-CIA cultural clash impeded results.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-317intelligence cable

Predator over Afghanistan, autumn 2000: likely UBL, no shoot capability

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2004-03-19

CIA notes in the 2012 File say an unarmed Predator twice observed a person most likely to be bin Laden in autumn 2000 and could not act.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4

Later recollections / analysis

87
EVD-314web archive

September 11th Sourcebooks index (NSArchive volumes I–VII and updates)

National Security Archive — September 11th Sourcebooks · 2026-09-03

The National Security Archive organised a September 11th Sourcebook series of at least seven volumes plus later FOIA postings on Clarke, FAA, and NTSB transcripts.

Quality 3.63 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp1
Corr3
Spec4
Comp4
Chain4
EVD-326web archive

The Osama Bin Laden File (NSAEBB 343), posted 2 May 2011

The Osama Bin Laden File (NSAEBB 343) · 2011-05-02

On the day of bin Laden's death the National Security Archive posted an Osama Bin Laden File that is an index of prior FOIA briefing books on UBL, Pakistan, and the Taliban.

Quality 3.63 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp1
Corr3
Spec4
Comp4
Chain4
EVD-315government report

CIA 9/11 File posting — 100+ FOIA documents, 19 June 2012

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2012-06-19

In 2012 the National Security Archive posted 100+ CIA documents cited in Commission footnotes, and stated that this was about one-quarter of the CIA material the Commission cited, with KSM interrogation reports still withheld.

Quality 3.63 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp1
Corr3
Spec4
Comp4
Chain4
EVD-323flight record

NTSB path studies and ATC transcripts FOIA'd by NSArchive (Aug 2006)

NTSB flight-path studies and ATC transcripts released via NSArchive (NSAEBB 196) · 2006-08-11

In August 2006 NTSB released to the National Security Archive the four-flight ATC transcripts, three path studies, and the UA93 DFDR specialist report, after refusing to open its own public docket.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-209academic paper

David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in the 9/11 Commission Report (Toronto Report ch.2)

The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11

Griffin's 2012 chapter lists Commission process constraints (Zelikow, funding, access) and twelve claimed omissions, with footnotes to named books, newspapers, and the Report itself.

Quality 3.13 / 5components retained
Prov4
Auth4
Ind3
Contemp1
Corr2
Spec4
Comp4
Chain3
EVD-030government report

Joint Inquiry discussion of Osama Bassnan and alleged Saudi payments

Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After 9/11 (including Part Four, declassified 2016) · 2016-07-15

A congressional inquiry recorded alleged Bassnan–Saudi official financial ties in the same city as the hijackers.

Quality 2.38 / 5components retained
Prov4
Auth3
Ind3
Contemp3
Corr1
Spec1
Comp1
Chain3

Official documents

80
EVD-325government report

Taliban File update: U.S. pressed Taliban to expel UBL over 30 times

The Taliban File (NSAEBB 97) and updates · 2004-01-30

The National Security Archive's Taliban File update states the U.S. pressed the Taliban to expel bin Laden over 30 times, with only three approaches in the first Bush year.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-326web archive

The Osama Bin Laden File (NSAEBB 343), posted 2 May 2011

The Osama Bin Laden File (NSAEBB 343) · 2011-05-02

On the day of bin Laden's death the National Security Archive posted an Osama Bin Laden File that is an index of prior FOIA briefing books on UBL, Pakistan, and the Taliban.

Quality 3.63 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp1
Corr3
Spec4
Comp4
Chain4
EVD-333government report

CIA IG August 2001: CTC practices reviewed positively — vs later OIG/Commission

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-01

NSArchive records that a CIA Inspector General review completed in August 2001 praised CTC information-management and FBI cooperation, in contrast to the 2004 CIA OIG and the Commission.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-320intelligence cable

CIA SEIBs June–August 2001: Bin Ladin attacks 'imminent' / 'in the US'

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-07

CIA senior briefs from June–August 2001 repeatedly warned of imminent Bin Ladin operations, including a 7 August SEIB titled 'Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US', and a 24 August note that an associated individual was considering U.S. operations without timing or targets.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-321intelligence cable

CIA CTC 2003-40044HC — '11 September: The Plot and the Plotters'

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2003-06-01

A 1 June 2003 CIA CTC report titled 11 September: The Plot and the Plotters exists, is a major Commission source, and includes the analytical claim that the Saudi composition of the teams had political as well as visa-access value.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-334intelligence cable

DCI Report draft 19 March 2004: FBI dissemination still 'spotty'; cultures clash

The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2004-03-19

A March 2004 CIA draft history says FBI internal dissemination remained so weak that CIA officers still hand-delivered messages, and that FBI-CIA cultural clash impeded results.

Quality 4.13 / 5components retained
Prov5
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr4
Spec5
Comp3
Chain4

Independent / media

56
EVD-209academic paper

David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in the 9/11 Commission Report (Toronto Report ch.2)

The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11

Griffin's 2012 chapter lists Commission process constraints (Zelikow, funding, access) and twelve claimed omissions, with footnotes to named books, newspapers, and the Report itself.

Quality 3.13 / 5components retained
Prov4
Auth4
Ind3
Contemp1
Corr2
Spec4
Comp4
Chain3
EVD-024media report

2024 reporting: Bayoumi misstated the timing of the Los Angeles trip

ProPublica / New York Times reporting on declassified FBI files (2023–2024) · 2024-08-09

Investigative journalists, citing civil-case evidence, report that Bayoumi's trip timing was false and the meeting appears planned.

Quality 2.25 / 5components retained
Prov2
Auth3
Ind3
Contemp1
Corr2
Spec3
Comp2
Chain2
EVD-143media report

Odigo: two employees received a warning message about two hours before the first impact

Odigo instant-message warning reports (Ha'aretz / Washington Post, 2001) · 2001-09-28

Odigo confirmed that two employees received a pre-attack warning message; origin not established in public files.

Quality 2.50 / 5components retained
Prov2
Auth3
Ind3
Contemp4
Corr2
Spec2
Comp2
Chain2
EVD-025media report

Commission leadership: FBI said it wasn't withholding anything

ProPublica / New York Times reporting on declassified FBI files (2023–2024) · 2023-04-27

The Commission chair states the FBI represented that nothing was being withheld.

Quality 2.50 / 5components retained
Prov2
Auth4
Ind3
Contemp1
Corr2
Spec4
Comp2
Chain2
EVD-126video

BBC Jane Standley reports WTC 7 collapsed while it stands on camera

BBC World — Jane Standley live report of WTC 7 collapse (11 September 2001) · 2001-09-11

BBC World reported WTC 7 had collapsed at a time when the building was still standing on camera.

Quality 4.00 / 5components retained
Prov4
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp5
Corr4
Spec4
Comp3
Chain4
EVD-124transcript

Larry Silverstein, PBS 2002: 'maybe the smartest thing to do is pull it'

PBS — America Rebuilds: A Day with Larry Silverstein (2002) · 2002-09-10

The leaseholder said on camera that he suggested they 'pull it' regarding WTC 7 and that a decision to pull preceded the collapse they watched.

Quality 3.50 / 5components retained
Prov4
Auth5
Ind3
Contemp2
Corr4
Spec3
Comp3
Chain4

Unresolved contradictions

  • CTR-008WTC dust chips: thermite vs primer paint
  • CTR-017WTC 7 Stage 1: NIST gradual vs Chandler instantaneous whole-roofline free fall
  • CTR-019IC911 journal vs IC911 journal on the Pentagon object
  • CTR-022NTSB public-docket refusal vs NSArchive FOIA release of the same path/ATC files

Developed by British researcher Moneypenny

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