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Keyword and entity retrieval over indexed evidence, hypotheses, and claims. Nothing is answered from model memory on this page. For a scored percentage with the working shown, open Fact or Fiction.
Topic remit
Day of
Engineering
Facilitation
Intelligence & process
Foreknowledge
Independent cluster
Entities
- Omar al-Bayoumi
- Nawaf al-Hazmi
- Fahad al-Thumairy
- Anwar al-Awlaki
- Mohdar Abdullah
- Prince Bandar bin Sultan
- Abdussattar Shaikh
- Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
- Osama Bassnan
- Holly Ratchford
- Mohamed Atta
- Ziad Jarrah
- Norman Mineta
- Dick Cheney
- Anthony Shaffer
- Zacarias Moussaoui
- Barry Jennings
- Michael Hess
- Jane Standley
- Sivaraj Shyam-Sunder
- Curt Weldon
- Mahmoud Ahmad
- David Chandler
- Ted Walter
- Tony Szamboti
- Natalie Schilling
- Philip Zelikow
- Paul Zarembka
- Mary Marshall Clark
- Barbara Elias-Sanborn
- Sajit Gandhi
Matching hypotheses
- H007Saudi-linked individuals knowingly facilitated Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-MihdharScore
- H008U.S. agencies possessed actionable pre-attack intelligence on these two operativesScore
- H003Aircraft impact and subsequent fire initiated WTC1 collapseScore
- H012Unusual pre-attack put-option activity reflected advance knowledge of the attacksScore
- H015Able Danger identified Atta's cell before 9/11 and was blocked from warning the FBIScore
- H016Urban Moving Systems detainees had organisational advance knowledge of the attacksScore
- H020Specific pre-attack warnings (Odigo and similar) show that some non-plot actors knew the morning's targetingScore
Matching claims
- verifiedCLM-001
Omar al-Bayoumi provided housing and banking assistance to Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar in San Diego in February 2000.
- partially_supportedCLM-003
Omar al-Bayoumi was a paid cooptee of Saudi GIP reporting via Ambassador Bandar.
- verifiedCLM-007
U.S. agencies had actionable information on Mihdhar's U.S. visa in January 2000 and failed to watchlist him until August 2001.
- indeterminateCLM-008
Bayoumi had advance knowledge that the 9/11 attacks would occur.
- disputedCLM-013
Aircraft impact and the ensuing fires initiated the collapses of WTC 1 and WTC 2 without additional energetic devices.
- disputedCLM-018
UA93 was shot down by U.S. military rather than crashed by a passenger counterattack.
- disputedCLM-020
Able Danger identified Mohamed Atta's cell before 11 September and was blocked from notifying the FBI.
- indeterminateCLM-021
Unusual pre-attack put-option activity reflected trading by people with advance knowledge of the plot.
- unverifiedCLM-022
The five Urban Moving Systems detainees had advance knowledge of the attacks as an Israeli intelligence team.
- unverifiedCLM-024
Pakistan's ISI chief authorised a pre-attack transfer to Mohamed Atta.
- partially_supportedCLM-026
NORAD/FAA war-games and false timelines indicate the air-defence failure was more than accident.
- disputedCLM-030
WTC 7's entire measurable north and west rooflines instantaneously transitioned to free fall, a behaviour NIST's Stage 1 description conceals.
- unverifiedCLM-034
Reported 9/11 aircraft manoeuvres were not flyable manually by the named hijacker-pilots (automation/remote guidance).
- disputedCLM-035
A small CIA Alec Station group intentionally withheld Mihdhar/Hazmi information from the FBI, and the purpose became to allow the attacks.
- disputedCLM-036
The Pentagon attack involved inside-the-building explosives before AA77's official impact.
- verifiedCLM-037
A large born-digital public archive of 11 September emails, stories, and images exists and was acquired by the Library of Congress in 2003.
- well_supportedCLM-038
Street-level witnesses in lower Manhattan saw/heard a second aircraft hit the South Tower.
- well_supportedCLM-039
CIA senior products in summer 2001 described Bin Ladin attacks as imminent, including a strike in the US, without time/place/target.
- verifiedCLM-040
NTSB produced flight-path studies and ATC transcripts for the four hijacked flights and initially refused a public docket.
Evidence supporting
61Able Danger: Shaffer/Weldon say Atta's Brooklyn cell was identified before 9/11
Able Danger hearings and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer / Rep. Curt Weldon statements (2005) · 2005-09-21
Able Danger officers testified they had identified Atta before 9/11 and were blocked from notifying the FBI. Commission staff found the claim unsupported.
Peter Dale Scott — 9/11 as a deep event: CIA personnel helped allow it (Toronto Report ch.5)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Scott's 2012 chapter restates a documented CIA-to-FBI withholding pattern around Mihdhar and Hazmi (Malaysia 2000, visa, watchlisting) attributed to a small Alec Station group, and adds a Saudi-GID liaison hypothesis plus an 'allowed to proceed' inference.
Barbara Honegger — Evidence of explosives at the Pentagon (Toronto Report ch.13)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Honegger compiles Pentagon witnesses who used bomb/cordite language, cites stopped clocks around 9:31–9:32, and treats the FBI code name PENTTBOM as evidence of a bombing investigation.
David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in the 9/11 Commission Report (Toronto Report ch.2)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists Commission process constraints (Zelikow, funding, access) and twelve claimed omissions, with footnotes to named books, newspapers, and the Report itself.
Paul Zarembka — Insider trading before 9/11 re-examined (Toronto Report ch.6)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
A 2012 hearing paper surveys three academic option-market studies and argues the combined pre-attack activity is not plausibly random, while treating UAL/AMR themselves as weak because of hedging.
David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in official accounts of AA77 and UA93 (Toronto Report ch.7)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists named process contradictions on AA77 notification and UA93 notification, plus Pentagon-object and UA93-shoot-down arguments with named witnesses and an FAA memo.
Evidence contradicting
12Commission staff: Able Danger Atta identification not substantiated
9/11 Commission Report · 2005-08-12
Commission staff published that they could not substantiate a pre-9/11 Able Danger identification of Atta.
Commission: UA93 crashed near Shanksville at 10:03:11 after a passenger revolt
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
UA93 impacted a field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, at 10:03:11. Official transcription of the CVR describes a passenger counterattack.
UA93 ACARS 09:23 and 09:28 mayday — NSAEBB 196 quotation
NTSB flight-path studies and ATC transcripts released via NSArchive (NSAEBB 196) · 2001-09-11
NTSB ACARS/ATC text quoted by NSArchive: UA93 received a 09:23 warning about cockpit intrusion and the NY impacts, then at 09:28 transmitted a mayday / 'hey get out of here' as it was hijacked.
Bažant pancake model vs NIST initiation sequence
Bažant et al. — pancake / progressive-collapse papers on the WTC towers · 2002-01-01
Published official-adjacent models disagree on pancake vs bowing-column initiation of the tower collapses.
NTSB flight-path study: AA77 from Dulles to the Pentagon
NTSB flight-path studies, Air Traffic Control tapes, and CVR/FDR summaries (AA11, UA175, AA77, UA93) · 2002-02-19
NTSB reconstructed a continuous radar/path track of AA77 from takeoff to the Pentagon.
Commission/SEC: no evidence anyone with advance knowledge profited in securities
9/11 Commission / SEC review of pre-attack securities trading · 2004-07-22
The Commission published a negative finding on securities profits by people with advance knowledge of the attacks.
Ambiguous
75Alleged ISI / Mahmoud Ahmad / Saeed Sheikh wire to Atta
Reporting on Lt. Gen. Mahmoud Ahmad, ISI, and alleged Atta funding via Saeed Sheikh · 2001-10-01
Ahmad was in Washington on 9/11; press alleged an ISI-linked transfer to Atta that is not confirmed by a public U.S. primary in this lab.
IC911 Data Archive — links inactive at ingest
International Center for 9/11 Justice · 2026-09-02
As of 2 September 2026 the IC911 data-archive page states that archive links are inactive and that a large archive of videos, photographs, and documents is being built.
Judge Daniels 2024: not 'just an innocent participant'
In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 (S.D.N.Y.) · 2024-08-01
A U.S. district judge in 2024 drew a reasonable-inference finding that Bayoumi's housing help was tasked by the Saudi government.
KSM: operatives told to pose as students and seek mosque help
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
The Commission records a KSM claim that the two were instructed to seek mosque assistance and that AQ had no California agents.
David Chandler — WTC 7: A refutation of NIST's analysis (Toronto Report ch.9)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Chandler's 2012 hearing paper treats NIST's own Stage 2 free-fall interval as established and argues the 5.4 s overall figure is an artefact of start-time choice.
IC911 who-we-are mission (research, preserve, public action)
International Center for 9/11 Justice · 2026-09-02
IC911 describes itself as preserving data, doing new research, and campaigning for a new investigation.
Contemporary reports
68Alleged ISI / Mahmoud Ahmad / Saeed Sheikh wire to Atta
Reporting on Lt. Gen. Mahmoud Ahmad, ISI, and alleged Atta funding via Saeed Sheikh · 2001-10-01
Ahmad was in Washington on 9/11; press alleged an ISI-linked transfer to Atta that is not confirmed by a public U.S. primary in this lab.
KSM: operatives told to pose as students and seek mosque help
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
The Commission records a KSM claim that the two were instructed to seek mosque assistance and that AQ had no California agents.
John Farmer: NORAD and some FAA accounts of 11 September were not true
John Farmer / 9/11 Commission staff statements on NORAD and FAA accounts · 2004-07-22
Commission senior counsel stated that NORAD's (and some FAA) accounts were not true.
CIA had Mihdhar visa information in January 2000; FBI notified August 2001
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
U.S. intelligence possessed Mihdhar's visa/travel data in January 2000 and did not get it to FBI watchlisting until August 2001.
Coleen Rowley: FBI HQ blocked a FISA search of Moussaoui's laptop
Coleen Rowley memo to FBI Director Mueller (May 2002) on the Moussaoui case · 2002-05-21
A flight-school student connected to radical jihadist travel was in FBI custody before 11 September; a requested FISA search was not obtained.
CIA SEIBs June–August 2001: Bin Ladin attacks 'imminent' / 'in the US'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-07
CIA senior briefs from June–August 2001 repeatedly warned of imminent Bin Ladin operations, including a 7 August SEIB titled 'Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US', and a 24 August note that an associated individual was considering U.S. operations without timing or targets.
Later recollections / analysis
80Able Danger: Shaffer/Weldon say Atta's Brooklyn cell was identified before 9/11
Able Danger hearings and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer / Rep. Curt Weldon statements (2005) · 2005-09-21
Able Danger officers testified they had identified Atta before 9/11 and were blocked from notifying the FBI. Commission staff found the claim unsupported.
Commission staff: Able Danger Atta identification not substantiated
9/11 Commission Report · 2005-08-12
Commission staff published that they could not substantiate a pre-9/11 Able Danger identification of Atta.
Peter Dale Scott — 9/11 as a deep event: CIA personnel helped allow it (Toronto Report ch.5)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Scott's 2012 chapter restates a documented CIA-to-FBI withholding pattern around Mihdhar and Hazmi (Malaysia 2000, visa, watchlisting) attributed to a small Alec Station group, and adds a Saudi-GID liaison hypothesis plus an 'allowed to proceed' inference.
Barbara Honegger — Evidence of explosives at the Pentagon (Toronto Report ch.13)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Honegger compiles Pentagon witnesses who used bomb/cordite language, cites stopped clocks around 9:31–9:32, and treats the FBI code name PENTTBOM as evidence of a bombing investigation.
David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in the 9/11 Commission Report (Toronto Report ch.2)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists Commission process constraints (Zelikow, funding, access) and twelve claimed omissions, with footnotes to named books, newspapers, and the Report itself.
Paul Zarembka — Insider trading before 9/11 re-examined (Toronto Report ch.6)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
A 2012 hearing paper surveys three academic option-market studies and argues the combined pre-attack activity is not plausibly random, while treating UAL/AMR themselves as weak because of hedging.
Official documents
72Able Danger: Shaffer/Weldon say Atta's Brooklyn cell was identified before 9/11
Able Danger hearings and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer / Rep. Curt Weldon statements (2005) · 2005-09-21
Able Danger officers testified they had identified Atta before 9/11 and were blocked from notifying the FBI. Commission staff found the claim unsupported.
Commission staff: Able Danger Atta identification not substantiated
9/11 Commission Report · 2005-08-12
Commission staff published that they could not substantiate a pre-9/11 Able Danger identification of Atta.
2011 Toronto Hearings and 2012 Toronto Report — catalogue
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
A 2011 academic/legal hearing produced an 18-chapter 2012 report arguing the official account is false. Eleven chapters are objects in this lab; seven are title-catalogued.
KSM: operatives told to pose as students and seek mosque help
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
The Commission records a KSM claim that the two were instructed to seek mosque assistance and that AQ had no California agents.
John Farmer: NORAD and some FAA accounts of 11 September were not true
John Farmer / 9/11 Commission staff statements on NORAD and FAA accounts · 2004-07-22
Commission senior counsel stated that NORAD's (and some FAA) accounts were not true.
CIA had Mihdhar visa information in January 2000; FBI notified August 2001
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
U.S. intelligence possessed Mihdhar's visa/travel data in January 2000 and did not get it to FBI watchlisting until August 2001.
Independent / media
50Peter Dale Scott — 9/11 as a deep event: CIA personnel helped allow it (Toronto Report ch.5)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Scott's 2012 chapter restates a documented CIA-to-FBI withholding pattern around Mihdhar and Hazmi (Malaysia 2000, visa, watchlisting) attributed to a small Alec Station group, and adds a Saudi-GID liaison hypothesis plus an 'allowed to proceed' inference.
Barbara Honegger — Evidence of explosives at the Pentagon (Toronto Report ch.13)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Honegger compiles Pentagon witnesses who used bomb/cordite language, cites stopped clocks around 9:31–9:32, and treats the FBI code name PENTTBOM as evidence of a bombing investigation.
David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in the 9/11 Commission Report (Toronto Report ch.2)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists Commission process constraints (Zelikow, funding, access) and twelve claimed omissions, with footnotes to named books, newspapers, and the Report itself.
Paul Zarembka — Insider trading before 9/11 re-examined (Toronto Report ch.6)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
A 2012 hearing paper surveys three academic option-market studies and argues the combined pre-attack activity is not plausibly random, while treating UAL/AMR themselves as weak because of hedging.
David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in official accounts of AA77 and UA93 (Toronto Report ch.7)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists named process contradictions on AA77 notification and UA93 notification, plus Pentagon-object and UA93-shoot-down arguments with named witnesses and an FAA memo.
Alleged ISI / Mahmoud Ahmad / Saeed Sheikh wire to Atta
Reporting on Lt. Gen. Mahmoud Ahmad, ISI, and alleged Atta funding via Saeed Sheikh · 2001-10-01
Ahmad was in Washington on 9/11; press alleged an ISI-linked transfer to Atta that is not confirmed by a public U.S. primary in this lab.
Unresolved contradictions
- CTR-010Able Danger Atta identification
- CTR-017WTC 7 Stage 1: NIST gradual vs Chandler instantaneous whole-roofline free fall