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Keyword and entity retrieval over indexed evidence, hypotheses, and claims. Nothing is answered from model memory on this page. For a scored percentage with the working shown, open Fact or Fiction.
Topic remit
Day of
Engineering
Facilitation
Intelligence & process
Foreknowledge
Independent cluster
Entities
- Omar al-Bayoumi
- Nawaf al-Hazmi
- Khalid al-Mihdhar
- Fahad al-Thumairy
- Anwar al-Awlaki
- Mohdar Abdullah
- Abdussattar Shaikh
- Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
- Ali Abdul Aziz Ali
- Osama Bassnan
- Mohamed Atta
- Larry Silverstein
- Norman Mineta
- Anthony Shaffer
- Kenneth Williams
- Coleen Rowley
- Zacarias Moussaoui
- Richard Gage
- J. Leroy Hulsey
- Judy Wood
- Barry Jennings
- Sivaraj Shyam-Sunder
- Curt Weldon
- Mahmoud Ahmad
- George W. Bush
- David Ray Griffin
- David Chandler
- Ted Walter
- Tony Szamboti
- Graeme MacQueen
- Kevin R. Ryan
- Piers Robinson
- Natalie Schilling
- Jonathan H. Cole
- Philip Zelikow
- James Gourley
- Søren Roest Korsgaard
- Lorie Van Auken
- Bob McIlvaine
- Peter Dale Scott
- Lance deHaven-Smith
- Kristina Claunch
- Mary Marshall Clark
- Peter Bearman
- Barbara Elias-Sanborn
- Richard A. Clarke
- Michael F. Scheuer
- Sajit Gandhi
- Michael Horrocks
- Thomas W. Eagar
- Christopher Musso
Matching hypotheses
- H004Additional energetic mechanisms contributed to WTC1 collapseScore
- H006Explosives contributed to WTC7 failureScore
- H017Directed energy, not impact/fire/conventional explosives, destroyed the twin towersScore
- H020Specific pre-attack warnings (Odigo and similar) show that some non-plot actors knew the morning's targetingScore
Matching claims
- verifiedCLM-001
Omar al-Bayoumi provided housing and banking assistance to Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar in San Diego in February 2000.
- contradictedCLM-005
Fahad al-Thumairy provided no assistance to the two operatives.
- partially_supportedCLM-006
Thumairy tasked an associate to help two 'very significant people' on arrival.
- verifiedCLM-007
U.S. agencies had actionable information on Mihdhar's U.S. visa in January 2000 and failed to watchlist him until August 2001.
- verifiedCLM-011
American Airlines Flight 11 struck World Trade Center 1 at 08:46:40 on 11 September 2001.
- disputedCLM-016
Explosives or other additional energetic mechanisms contributed to WTC 7's failure.
- unsupportedCLM-023
The twin towers were destroyed by directed energy, not by impact, fire, or conventional explosives.
- unverifiedCLM-024
Pakistan's ISI chief authorised a pre-attack transfer to Mohamed Atta.
- contradictedCLM-025
Some of the named 19 hijackers were not aboard the aircraft / were still alive.
- disputedCLM-030
WTC 7's entire measurable north and west rooflines instantaneously transitioned to free fall, a behaviour NIST's Stage 1 description conceals.
- disputedCLM-033
First-responder explosion-language about the Twin Towers is evidence of demolition charges.
- unverifiedCLM-034
Reported 9/11 aircraft manoeuvres were not flyable manually by the named hijacker-pilots (automation/remote guidance).
- disputedCLM-035
A small CIA Alec Station group intentionally withheld Mihdhar/Hazmi information from the FBI, and the purpose became to allow the attacks.
- verifiedCLM-037
A large born-digital public archive of 11 September emails, stories, and images exists and was acquired by the Library of Congress in 2003.
- well_supportedCLM-038
Street-level witnesses in lower Manhattan saw/heard a second aircraft hit the South Tower.
- well_supportedCLM-039
CIA senior products in summer 2001 described Bin Ladin attacks as imminent, including a strike in the US, without time/place/target.
- partially_supportedCLM-041
The U.S. pressed the Taliban to expel bin Laden more than 30 times, with only three approaches in the first Bush year.
Evidence supporting
62Clarke to Rice, 25 January 2001: Principals-level review of al-Qaeda urgently needed
Richard Clarke memo to Condoleezza Rice, 25 January 2001 (NSAEBB 147) · 2001-01-25
On 25 January 2001 Richard Clarke wrote to Condoleezza Rice that a Principals-level review of al-Qaeda was urgently needed.
CIA SEIBs June–August 2001: Bin Ladin attacks 'imminent' / 'in the US'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-07
CIA senior briefs from June–August 2001 repeatedly warned of imminent Bin Ladin operations, including a 7 August SEIB titled 'Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US', and a 24 August note that an associated individual was considering U.S. operations without timing or targets.
David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in the 9/11 Commission Report (Toronto Report ch.2)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists Commission process constraints (Zelikow, funding, access) and twelve claimed omissions, with footnotes to named books, newspapers, and the Report itself.
CIA email 21 August 2001: 'Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-21
A CIA email dated 21 August 2001 is titled Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar and is a Commission Chapter 8 citation.
CIA had Mihdhar visa information in January 2000; FBI notified August 2001
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
U.S. intelligence possessed Mihdhar's visa/travel data in January 2000 and did not get it to FBI watchlisting until August 2001.
Peter Dale Scott — 9/11 as a deep event: CIA personnel helped allow it (Toronto Report ch.5)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Scott's 2012 chapter restates a documented CIA-to-FBI withholding pattern around Mihdhar and Hazmi (Malaysia 2000, visa, watchlisting) attributed to a small Alec Station group, and adds a Saudi-GID liaison hypothesis plus an 'allowed to proceed' inference.
Evidence contradicting
14UA93 ACARS 09:23 and 09:28 mayday — NSAEBB 196 quotation
NTSB flight-path studies and ATC transcripts released via NSArchive (NSAEBB 196) · 2001-09-11
NTSB ACARS/ATC text quoted by NSArchive: UA93 received a 09:23 warning about cockpit intrusion and the NY impacts, then at 09:28 transmitted a mayday / 'hey get out of here' as it was hijacked.
Legge & Stutt — AA77 FDR analysis supports official Pentagon flight path (Jan 2011)
Journal of 9/11 Studies · 2011-01-01
A 2011 Journal of 9/11 Studies FDR analysis concludes the official AA77 path to Pentagon impact is supported.
Jonathan Cole — Discussion of Le & Bažant spontaneous-collapse paper (Jul 2023)
Journal of 9/11 Studies · 2023-07-01
An ASCE member published a 2023 discussion challenging Le & Bažant's spontaneous-collapse treatment of the towers.
Bažant pancake model vs NIST initiation sequence
Bažant et al. — pancake / progressive-collapse papers on the WTC towers · 2002-01-01
Published official-adjacent models disagree on pancake vs bowing-column initiation of the tower collapses.
NTSB flight-path study: AA77 from Dulles to the Pentagon
NTSB flight-path studies, Air Traffic Control tapes, and CVR/FDR summaries (AA11, UA175, AA77, UA93) · 2002-02-19
NTSB reconstructed a continuous radar/path track of AA77 from takeoff to the Pentagon.
ASCE Pentagon building performance: 757-class impact damage
ASCE/SEI Pentagon Building Performance Report (2003) · 2003-01-01
An engineering team mapped interior damage consistent with a large-aircraft mass trajectory through the Pentagon.
Ambiguous
73CIA IG August 2001: CTC practices reviewed positively — vs later OIG/Commission
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-01
NSArchive records that a CIA Inspector General review completed in August 2001 praised CTC information-management and FBI cooperation, in contrast to the 2004 CIA OIG and the Commission.
CIA CTC 2003-40044HC — '11 September: The Plot and the Plotters'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2003-06-01
A 1 June 2003 CIA CTC report titled 11 September: The Plot and the Plotters exists, is a major Commission source, and includes the analytical claim that the Saudi composition of the teams had political as well as visa-access value.
NTSB path studies and ATC transcripts FOIA'd by NSArchive (Aug 2006)
NTSB flight-path studies and ATC transcripts released via NSArchive (NSAEBB 196) · 2006-08-11
In August 2006 NTSB released to the National Security Archive the four-flight ATC transcripts, three path studies, and the UA93 DFDR specialist report, after refusing to open its own public docket.
September 11th Sourcebooks index (NSArchive volumes I–VII and updates)
National Security Archive — September 11th Sourcebooks · 2026-09-03
The National Security Archive organised a September 11th Sourcebook series of at least seven volumes plus later FOIA postings on Clarke, FAA, and NTSB transcripts.
Columbia 9/11 Oral History Project — holdings statement
Columbia Center for Oral History Research — September 11 Oral History Project · 2026-09-03
Columbia's 9/11 oral-history project reports five programmes, over 900 hours with over 600 people, 351 of them open, plus a 2011 book. Transcripts were not ingested.
Kevin R. Ryan — Why the NIST World Trade Center Reports are False (Toronto Report ch.3)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Ryan cites NIST test and model figures (steel temperatures, sag, expansion, fire duration) and states they do not support the published collapse sequences; he notes NIST did not release its global models for independent runs.
Contemporary reports
69Clarke to Rice, 25 January 2001: Principals-level review of al-Qaeda urgently needed
Richard Clarke memo to Condoleezza Rice, 25 January 2001 (NSAEBB 147) · 2001-01-25
On 25 January 2001 Richard Clarke wrote to Condoleezza Rice that a Principals-level review of al-Qaeda was urgently needed.
CIA SEIBs June–August 2001: Bin Ladin attacks 'imminent' / 'in the US'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-07
CIA senior briefs from June–August 2001 repeatedly warned of imminent Bin Ladin operations, including a 7 August SEIB titled 'Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US', and a 24 August note that an associated individual was considering U.S. operations without timing or targets.
CIA email 21 August 2001: 'Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-21
A CIA email dated 21 August 2001 is titled Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar and is a Commission Chapter 8 citation.
CIA IG August 2001: CTC practices reviewed positively — vs later OIG/Commission
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-01
NSArchive records that a CIA Inspector General review completed in August 2001 praised CTC information-management and FBI cooperation, in contrast to the 2004 CIA OIG and the Commission.
CIA had Mihdhar visa information in January 2000; FBI notified August 2001
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
U.S. intelligence possessed Mihdhar's visa/travel data in January 2000 and did not get it to FBI watchlisting until August 2001.
CIA CTC 2003-40044HC — '11 September: The Plot and the Plotters'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2003-06-01
A 1 June 2003 CIA CTC report titled 11 September: The Plot and the Plotters exists, is a major Commission source, and includes the analytical claim that the Saudi composition of the teams had political as well as visa-access value.
Later recollections / analysis
80David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in the 9/11 Commission Report (Toronto Report ch.2)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists Commission process constraints (Zelikow, funding, access) and twelve claimed omissions, with footnotes to named books, newspapers, and the Report itself.
Peter Dale Scott — 9/11 as a deep event: CIA personnel helped allow it (Toronto Report ch.5)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Scott's 2012 chapter restates a documented CIA-to-FBI withholding pattern around Mihdhar and Hazmi (Malaysia 2000, visa, watchlisting) attributed to a small Alec Station group, and adds a Saudi-GID liaison hypothesis plus an 'allowed to proceed' inference.
NTSB path studies and ATC transcripts FOIA'd by NSArchive (Aug 2006)
NTSB flight-path studies and ATC transcripts released via NSArchive (NSAEBB 196) · 2006-08-11
In August 2006 NTSB released to the National Security Archive the four-flight ATC transcripts, three path studies, and the UA93 DFDR specialist report, after refusing to open its own public docket.
David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in official accounts of AA77 and UA93 (Toronto Report ch.7)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists named process contradictions on AA77 notification and UA93 notification, plus Pentagon-object and UA93-shoot-down arguments with named witnesses and an FAA memo.
September 11th Sourcebooks index (NSArchive volumes I–VII and updates)
National Security Archive — September 11th Sourcebooks · 2026-09-03
The National Security Archive organised a September 11th Sourcebook series of at least seven volumes plus later FOIA postings on Clarke, FAA, and NTSB transcripts.
2011 Toronto Hearings and 2012 Toronto Report — catalogue
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
A 2011 academic/legal hearing produced an 18-chapter 2012 report arguing the official account is false. Eleven chapters are objects in this lab; seven are title-catalogued.
Official documents
71Clarke to Rice, 25 January 2001: Principals-level review of al-Qaeda urgently needed
Richard Clarke memo to Condoleezza Rice, 25 January 2001 (NSAEBB 147) · 2001-01-25
On 25 January 2001 Richard Clarke wrote to Condoleezza Rice that a Principals-level review of al-Qaeda was urgently needed.
CIA SEIBs June–August 2001: Bin Ladin attacks 'imminent' / 'in the US'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-07
CIA senior briefs from June–August 2001 repeatedly warned of imminent Bin Ladin operations, including a 7 August SEIB titled 'Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US', and a 24 August note that an associated individual was considering U.S. operations without timing or targets.
CIA email 21 August 2001: 'Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-21
A CIA email dated 21 August 2001 is titled Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar and is a Commission Chapter 8 citation.
CIA IG August 2001: CTC practices reviewed positively — vs later OIG/Commission
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-01
NSArchive records that a CIA Inspector General review completed in August 2001 praised CTC information-management and FBI cooperation, in contrast to the 2004 CIA OIG and the Commission.
CIA had Mihdhar visa information in January 2000; FBI notified August 2001
9/11 Commission Report · 2004-07-22
U.S. intelligence possessed Mihdhar's visa/travel data in January 2000 and did not get it to FBI watchlisting until August 2001.
CIA CTC 2003-40044HC — '11 September: The Plot and the Plotters'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2003-06-01
A 1 June 2003 CIA CTC report titled 11 September: The Plot and the Plotters exists, is a major Commission source, and includes the analytical claim that the Saudi composition of the teams had political as well as visa-access value.
Independent / media
51David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in the 9/11 Commission Report (Toronto Report ch.2)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists Commission process constraints (Zelikow, funding, access) and twelve claimed omissions, with footnotes to named books, newspapers, and the Report itself.
Peter Dale Scott — 9/11 as a deep event: CIA personnel helped allow it (Toronto Report ch.5)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Scott's 2012 chapter restates a documented CIA-to-FBI withholding pattern around Mihdhar and Hazmi (Malaysia 2000, visa, watchlisting) attributed to a small Alec Station group, and adds a Saudi-GID liaison hypothesis plus an 'allowed to proceed' inference.
David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in official accounts of AA77 and UA93 (Toronto Report ch.7)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists named process contradictions on AA77 notification and UA93 notification, plus Pentagon-object and UA93-shoot-down arguments with named witnesses and an FAA memo.
2011 Toronto Hearings and 2012 Toronto Report — catalogue
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
A 2011 academic/legal hearing produced an 18-chapter 2012 report arguing the official account is false. Eleven chapters are objects in this lab; seven are title-catalogued.
Kevin R. Ryan — Why the NIST World Trade Center Reports are False (Toronto Report ch.3)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Ryan cites NIST test and model figures (steel temperatures, sag, expansion, fire duration) and states they do not support the published collapse sequences; he notes NIST did not release its global models for independent runs.
David Chandler — WTC 7: A refutation of NIST's analysis (Toronto Report ch.9)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Chandler's 2012 hearing paper treats NIST's own Stage 2 free-fall interval as established and argues the 5.4 s overall figure is an artefact of start-time choice.
Unresolved contradictions
- CTR-016NORAD first story vs NORAD tapes
- CTR-020CIA withholding: incompetence vs allowed-to-proceed
- CTR-021CIA IG August 2001 praise vs 2004 CIA OIG / Commission on CTC