Fact or Fiction
Fact or Fiction
Ask any question, including odd ones. You get a percentage, a clear call of more or less than 50%, the working, and the sources that produced it. If nothing matches, the score stays at 50% — nothing is invented.
Likelihood
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381)
56%
More than 50% — weakly supported by the sources
The score is 56% — more than 50%. Supporting sources currently outweigh contradicting sources after quality and confidence are applied.
How 56% was calculated
Start at 50%. Move by half of the net source score after uncertainty. Net source score is 0.54 (from −1 contradict to +1 support). Uncertainty is 79%. So 50% + 50% × 0.54 × 21% remaining certainty = 56%.
Supporting sources
12
Weighted strength 2.75
Contradicting sources
3
Weighted strength 0.81
No stance yet
38
Pulls the score toward 50% · 12.99
Uncertainty
79%
Share of the file that is unlabelled or missing
Working
start at 50% + half of (net source score × remaining certainty)
0.5 + 0.5 × 0.54 × (1 − 0.79) = 0.557
This percentage is calculated from the sources listed below — it is a score, not a court finding. Official origin does not add extra weight. Independent origin does not subtract weight. Two papers from the same group are one cluster, not two independent confirmations.
Reasoning
Step 1 · Match the question
Closest stored question: H015 — Able Danger identified Atta's cell before 9/11 and was blocked from warning the FBI. Yes/no labels are taken from sources already linked to that question. Also close: H009, H016, H008.
Step 2 · Find matching sources
40 source(s) matched the wording. 2 further source(s) already linked to the stored question were included even if they did not contain the search words. 6 matching claim(s) contributed inherited stances.
Step 3 · Assign support or contradiction without inventing
2 labelled from stored question links, 15 from claims, 0 labelled automatically (capped, marked, not saved as human review), 36 left with no stance.
Step 4 · Weight each source
Each source contributes strength = (quality / 5) × confidence × how strongly it agrees or disagrees. Support strength 2.75, contradict strength 0.81, no-stance strength 12.99. A zero on chain of custody still lowers the mean and stays visible.
Step 5 · Turn that into a percentage
Start at 50%. Move up if support outweighs contradiction, down if the reverse. Unlabelled sources shrink the movement, so a thin file stays near 50%. Working: 0.5 + 0.5 × 0.54 × (1 − 0.79) = 0.557.
Step 6 · What this number is not
This percentage is calculated from the sources listed below — it is a score, not a court finding. Official origin does not add extra weight. Independent origin does not subtract weight. Two papers from the same group are one cluster, not two independent confirmations.
What is still missing
- 7 source(s) score zero on at least one quality check (shown on each card). Those zeros are kept visible and are not averaged away.
- 3 source(s) are unverified, inactive, or recorded as not retrieved. A missing file is a gap, not a finding against the question.
- 38 relevant source(s) have no stance yet. They increase uncertainty and pull the percentage toward 50%; they are not counted as support or contradiction.
- A second stored question (H009) also matches this wording. The percentage below is for H015 only — open the other question to compare. Do not average the two numbers.
Closest stored question
H015 · Able Danger identified Atta's cell before 9/11 and was blocked from warning the FBIintelligence_failure · match 5.9
Related questions
Same wording can map to more than one stored question. Each has its own percentage — do not average them.
Matching claims
- well_supportedCLM-009
The FBI withheld Bayoumi-related intelligence from the 9/11 Commission.
- well_supportedCLM-042
About three-quarters of CIA materials cited by the 9/11 Commission, including all KSM interrogation reports, remained withheld as of the 2012 File posting.
- unverifiedCLM-022
The five Urban Moving Systems detainees had advance knowledge of the attacks as an Israeli intelligence team.
- disputedCLM-031
The 9/11 Commission was not a truth-seeking body; the Report is a 'Zelikow Report' defined by systematic omissions.
- indeterminateCLM-008
Bayoumi had advance knowledge that the 9/11 attacks would occur.
- unverifiedCLM-034
Reported 9/11 aircraft manoeuvres were not flyable manually by the named hijacker-pilots (automation/remote guidance).
Sources that support this
12CIA 9/11 File posting — 100+ FOIA documents, 19 June 2012
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2012-06-19
In 2012 the National Security Archive posted 100+ CIA documents cited in Commission footnotes, and stated that this was about one-quarter of the CIA material the Commission cited, with KSM interrogation reports still withheld.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-042.
DCI Report draft 19 March 2004: FBI dissemination still 'spotty'; cultures clash
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2004-03-19
A March 2004 CIA draft history says FBI internal dissemination remained so weak that CIA officers still hand-delivered messages, and that FBI-CIA cultural clash impeded results.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-042.
FBI 2017: Commission-era non-confirmation, later confirmation of intel role
FBI materials released under Executive Order 14040 · 2017-06-14
FBI 2017 text asserts the intelligence-role allegation was unconfirmed in 2004 and is now confirmed.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-009.
Able Danger: Shaffer/Weldon say Atta's Brooklyn cell was identified before 9/11
Able Danger hearings and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer / Rep. Curt Weldon statements (2005) · 2005-09-21
Able Danger officers testified they had identified Atta before 9/11 and were blocked from notifying the FBI. Commission staff found the claim unsupported.
hypothesis link · human_seed link to H015 (seeded): Shaffer/Weldon Atta-identification testimony.
Commission leadership: FBI said it wasn't withholding anything
ProPublica / New York Times reporting on declassified FBI files (2023–2024) · 2023-04-27
The Commission chair states the FBI represented that nothing was being withheld.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-009.
Urban Moving Systems five employees detained after being reported celebrating / filming
FBI files on Urban Moving Systems and five Israeli nationals detained 11 September 2001 · 2001-09-11
Five Urban Moving Systems employees were detained after witness reports they filmed and appeared to celebrate the attacks; they were later deported without terrorism charges.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-022.
David Ray Griffin — Anomalies in the 9/11 Commission Report (Toronto Report ch.2)
The 9/11 Toronto Report (2012), International Hearings on the Events of September 11, 2001 · 2012-09-11
Griffin's 2012 chapter lists Commission process constraints (Zelikow, funding, access) and twelve claimed omissions, with footnotes to named books, newspapers, and the Report itself.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-031.
Sources that contradict this
3Commission staff: Able Danger Atta identification not substantiated
9/11 Commission Report · 2005-08-12
Commission staff published that they could not substantiate a pre-9/11 Able Danger identification of Atta.
hypothesis link · human_seed link to H015 (seeded): Commission staff unsubstantiated.
NTSB flight-path study: AA77 from Dulles to the Pentagon
NTSB flight-path studies, Air Traffic Control tapes, and CVR/FDR summaries (AA11, UA175, AA77, UA93) · 2002-02-19
NTSB reconstructed a continuous radar/path track of AA77 from takeoff to the Pentagon.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-034.
Legge & Stutt — AA77 FDR analysis supports official Pentagon flight path (Jan 2011)
Journal of 9/11 Studies · 2011-01-01
A 2011 Journal of 9/11 Studies FDR analysis concludes the official AA77 path to Pentagon impact is supported.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-034.
Sources with no stance yet
38FBI analytical statement: 50/50 chance Bayoumi had advance knowledge
FBI materials released under Executive Order 14040 · 2017-06-14
An FBI analytical product assigned even odds to Bayoumi's advance knowledge of the attacks.
claim stance · Inherited from matching claim CLM-008.
Piers Robinson — Manual or Automated? Flight simulation of reported 9/11 aircraft manoeuvres (May 2026)
Piers Robinson, Manual or Automated? Flight simulation study of reported 9/11 aircraft manoeuvres (May 2026) · 2026-05-01
IC911 published a May 2026 Robinson report whose title frames reported 9/11 manoeuvres as a manual-vs-automated question.
claim stance · zeros: contemporaneity · Inherited from matching claim CLM-034.
Quality zeros remain visible: contemporaneity.
CIA IG August 2001: CTC practices reviewed positively — vs later OIG/Commission
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-01
NSArchive records that a CIA Inspector General review completed in August 2001 praised CTC information-management and FBI cooperation, in contrast to the 2004 CIA OIG and the Commission.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
CIA email 21 August 2001: 'Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-21
A CIA email dated 21 August 2001 is titled Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar and is a Commission Chapter 8 citation.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
1998 raw intelligence: UBL hijack trial run at a New York airport
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 1998-12-03
A December 1998 CIA raw report, later a PDB item, stated that a UBL-linked hijack plan was proceeding and that two team members in the U.S. had evaded security in a New York airport trial run.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
CIA SEIBs June–August 2001: Bin Ladin attacks 'imminent' / 'in the US'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2001-08-07
CIA senior briefs from June–August 2001 repeatedly warned of imminent Bin Ladin operations, including a 7 August SEIB titled 'Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US', and a 24 August note that an associated individual was considering U.S. operations without timing or targets.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
Predator over Afghanistan, autumn 2000: likely UBL, no shoot capability
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2004-03-19
CIA notes in the 2012 File say an unarmed Predator twice observed a person most likely to be bin Laden in autumn 2000 and could not act.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
CIA CTC 2003-40044HC — '11 September: The Plot and the Plotters'
The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File (NSAEBB 381) · 2003-06-01
A 1 June 2003 CIA CTC report titled 11 September: The Plot and the Plotters exists, is a major Commission source, and includes the analytical claim that the Saudi composition of the teams had political as well as visa-access value.
unclassified · Retrieved as relevant; no inherited polarity. Unclassified mass raises uncertainty rather than inventing support or contradiction.
Topics
Day-of events, engineering questions, process failures, and foreknowledge leads.